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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This paper  estimates  the  effect  of  job  loss  on mortality  for older  male  workers  with  a  strong  labor  force
attachment.  Using  Dutch  administrative  data,  we  find  that  job  loss  due  to firm  closure  increased  the
probability  of  death  within  five  years  by  a sizable  0.60  percentage  points.  Importantly,  this  effect  is
estimated  using  a model  that  controls  for firm-level  worker  characteristics,  such as  lagged  firm-level
annual  average  mortality  rates.  On  the  mechanism  driving  the  effect  of  job  loss  on  mortality,  we provide
evidence  for  an  effect  running  through  stress  and  changes  in life  style.
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Job loss is a frequent event that many individuals experience
n their lives. From January 2013 through December 2015, there
ere about 3.2 million workers displaced from jobs they had held
or at least 3 years in the United States alone (Bureau of Labor
tatistics, 2016). First-order effects on workers’ economic circum-
tances may  be due to the associated income loss that can have
ong-lasting, permanent effects (Jacobson et al., 1993; Couch and
laczek, 2010). Job loss, and in particular, layoffs, can be associated
ith strong effects on people’s lives in general and health in par-
icular, through a variety of channels. Workers may  get surprised
y a sudden career disruption, experience subsequent job instabil-
ty (Stevens, 1997), have difficulties coping with the change and
xperience detrimental effects on their life style (Deb et al., 2011;
alba et al., 2005), financial situation (Jacobson et al., 1993; Couch
nd Placzek, 2010), physical health (Black et al., 2015) and men-
al health (Kuhn et al., 2009). In the extreme, involuntary job loss
ay  result in death (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and
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167-6296/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Storrie, 2009a; Browning and Heinesen, 2012).1 We  reinvestigate
the effect of job loss on mortality, using administrative data from
the Netherlands. We  find evidence of a sizable positive effect.
Estimating the effect of job loss on mortality is challenging, as
job loss can occur for many reasons and is likely to be endogenous
to health and mortality.2 Previous studies typically try to handle
the endogeneity issue by considering specific causes of job loss as
treatments: job loss due to firm closure (Eliason and Storrie, 2009a;
Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Michaud et al., 2016), job loss due
to firm bankruptcy (Keefe et al., 2002) and job loss in firms expe-
riencing large firm-level employment declines (Sullivan and Von
Wachter, 2009). Control groups consist of workers employed in
continuing firms, or workers in firms unaffected by large workforce
reductions, respectively. The rationale for drawing these specifictreatment group. The approach potentially ignores selective work-
1 The general economic circumstances causing job loss may  affect health and
mortality as well. Ruhm (2000), for instance, finds that mortality is procyclical.
2 The effect of job loss on health and mortality is studied in other strands of lit-

































































having had a real wage income of at least 20,000 euros in the pre-
ceding year.6 We  focus on older workers, because annual mortality
rates of young workers are very low to begin with. As death is so
3 The effect of job loss on mortality with controlling for firm-level worker char-
acteristics is not statistically significantly different from the effect of job loss on
mortality without controlling for firm-level worker characteristics at the ten percent
level.
4 The original file names are SSB Banen (1999–2006), BEONTTAB (2003–2005),
SSB  Personen (2002–2005), Doodsoorzaken (1999–2010) and Landelijke Medische
Registratie (LMR, 2002–2004). Statistics Netherlands only provides data that are
administered by governmental institutions. The data that are administered are not
always available for the years we are interested in.
5 We do not include women in our baseline sample, because we study the effect
of  job loss on mortality for older workers with strong labor force attachment. Strong
labor force attachment is meant to make sure that stakes are high upon job loss. Since
mortality is a low probability event for most working age individuals, we need largeH. Bloemen et al. / Journal of 
orce dynamics, however. In particular, it requires the absence of a
riori differences in workers’ health outcomes between treatment
nd control group. Workers employed in closing firms and firms
xperiencing large employment declines may  have poorer health
han those employed in firms that do not close or do not shrink.
ossible pre-existing differences in firm-level worker health mea-
ures and mortality rates may  exist due to selective hiring or due to
on-random worker outflow prior to treatment. Not controlling for
otential pre-existing differences in firm-level worker health and
ortality rates may  lead to upward bias in the estimate of the effect
f job loss on mortality. We  aim to avoid such bias by explicitly con-
rolling for pre-existing differences in firm-level worker mortality
ates and health and other firm-level worker characteristics. To our
nowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that follows this
pproach.
Earlier studies typically find a positive effect of job loss on mor-
ality (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and Storrie, 2009a;
rowning and Heinesen, 2012; Michaud et al., 2016). Kuhn et al.
2009), Browning and Heinesen (2012) and Black et al. (2015) find
hat job loss has a positive effect on hospitalization and a negative
ffect on health. Conversely, Browning et al. (2006) as well as Salm
2009) do not find an effect of job loss on hospitalization or health.
What is still not clear in the literature is how job loss affects
ealth and mortality. There is evidence that job loss affects mortal-
ty via reduced lifetime earnings (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009)
nd that job loss increases self-harm (Keefe et al., 2002; Browning
nd Heinesen, 2012), mental illness (Kuhn et al., 2009; Browning
nd Heinesen, 2012), traffic accidents (Browning and Heinesen,
012), smoking (Black et al., 2015), drinking (Eliason and Storrie,
009a; Deb et al., 2011; Browning and Heinesen, 2012), and that
t induces having an unhealthier BMI  (Deb et al., 2011). Our cause-
pecific mortality analysis shows that cerebrovascular diseases and
moking-related cancers are important drivers of the effect.
We  use administrative employee-employer matched data from
he Netherlands for the period 1999–2010. We  estimate the effect
f job loss on the probability of death within five years. There are
 number of reasons why mortality is an outcome variable of core
nterest. First, length of life is directly relevant to the experienced
elfare of individuals and their families. Second, mortality is an
vent which is distinctly and objectively observed in our data and
oes not raise issues of interpretation or subjectivity, unlike, say,
elf-reported health as available in surveys. As treatment, we use
ob loss due to firm closure with a sudden nature, based on an event
hat we are able to identify in the data: we select firms that have
ot experienced strong workforce decline in the years preceding
losure. As all workers of closing firms lose their jobs, there is no
electivity of job loss within firms. Job loss due to this sudden type
f firm closure is unlikely to suffer from anticipation of job loss,
nlike wider definitions of closure-related job loss used in several
ther studies. US data suggest that job loss due to firm closure is
elevant, as among those displaced from jobs held for at least three
ears, 37% or 1.2 million workers were displaced due to firm closure
n the period 2013–2015 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016).
The control group in our approach consists of observations on
orkers who stayed in their jobs in the year of observation. The
reatment group consists of workers who were laid off in the year
f observation specifically because of firm closure. For male work-
rs with strong labor force attachment, we find that job loss due
o firm closure increased the probability of death in the first five
ears after job loss by 0.60 percentage points or 34%. This result is
n relative terms similar to what Eliason and Storrie (2009a) and
rowning and Heinesen (2012) find, who do not control for firm-evel worker characteristics. We  find that without controlling for
rm-level worker characteristics, job loss would have increased
his probability by 0.83 percentage points or 46%. This suggests that
ot controlling for pre-existing differences in firm-level worker Economics 59 (2018) 78–90 79
characteristics such as mortality rates between workers employed
in closing firms and those employed in firms that continued oper-
ations indeed biases the estimate of the mortality effect of job loss
upwards.3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background on the data and furnishes descriptives. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the institutional setting. Section 4 explains the
identification strategy and Section 5 presents the empirical results.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
We have Dutch administrative micro panel data available for
the period 1999–2010. The data are administered by Statistics
Netherlands and cover the entire Dutch population. We  have access
to data on job and personal characteristics, mortality and hospital
stays. These data can be linked through a personal identifier.4 In
addition, the data on job characteristics can be linked through a
job and employer identifier. We  measure labor force status, firm
characteristics and lay-off in 2003–2005. We  use data from pre-
vious years to construct variables such as pre-existing differences
in firm-level worker mortality, and we  use data from subsequent
years to construct the probability of death within five years.
The personal characteristics file contains information on demo-
graphic characteristics such as marital status, number of children,
country of birth, birth year and birth month. The job characteris-
tics file provides information on all jobs any individual had been
employed in. For every job, both start and end date, the industry
code and the annual wage income are available. We  deflate income
to base year 2004. The job characteristics file also provides infor-
mation on whether job terminations were due to firm bankruptcy
or mass layoff and it enables us to define job loss due to firm clo-
sure. The mortality file contains information such as month, year
and primary cause of death. The hospital stay file provides infor-
mation for every hospital stay such as the start and end date of the
spell, the reason for the stay and where the patient went after being
discharged from the hospital.
For our analysis we make a baseline selection of observations,
as we want to restrict ourselves to a group of workers for whom
we may  reasonably expect a mortality effect of job loss. In Section
5.4.3, we  verify whether our result is robust to changing the vari-
ous data selection criteria. In general, we  find that our result is very
robust. Our baseline sample is restricted to observations on male
workers in the age category 45–59 who had stable employment
relationships.5 We  define stable employment as having had con-
tinuous job tenure of at least five years with the present firm, whilenumbers of older workers to have sufficient statistical power for performing a sound
analysis. Labor force participation of women was  much lower than for men, while
part-time work was  much more frequent for women for the birth cohorts we study.
6 As is customary, our register data do not contain information on hours worked.
The  income threshold of 20,000 euro corresponds to about 130 percent of the annual
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are among the young, if anything, we may  expect to find mortality
ffects of job loss for older workers rather than for younger workers
or the short time horizon we study. We  only consider workers with
table employment relationships, because those with unstable jobs
ay  be used to losing and switching jobs, or they may  work so few
ours that job loss may  not be shocking for them.
Following Browning and Heinesen (2012), we exclude observa-
ions on workers employed in firms that had less than five workers.7
e  do so in order to remove self-employed and their employees
rom the sample. Those small firms may  be inherently unstable. We
lso exclude observations on workers employed in large firms that
ad 400 workers or more, because large firms may  be older, more
table and less likely to close, so they predominantly end up in the
ontrol group without having a counterpart in the treatment group.
We define job termination due to firm closure as job termina-
ions in firms that do not appear in the dataset anymore during
ater years. We  exclude observations on job departures other than
ayoffs due to firm closure, because workers departing their jobs
or other reasons receive a different treatment than the one we  are
rimarily interested in. We  exclude observations on workers who
ere laid off due to firm closure if at least 40% of the workforce
f the closing firm got employed in one particular firm within one
ear after firm closure.8 We  do so to rule out takeovers or restarts
f firms after closure that are not separately coded in the data (also
ee Browning and Heinesen, 2012).
Lastly, closing firms may  have laid off significant shares of their
orkforces prior to closure. This is a potential threat to the valid-
ty of our approach for various reasons. First, layoffs of co-workers
nd the threat of layoffs of workers may  impose stress on workers
nd may  possibly affect workers’ health and health behavior. Sec-
nd, prior firm-level layoffs may  make workers expect that the firm
loses or even goes bankrupt in the foreseeable future. Especially,
elatively productive workers with good job prospects elsewhere
ay  leave the firm and find alternative employment once they
xpect the firm to shut down (Henningsen and Hægeland, 2008;
chwerdt, 2011). Third, prior firm-level layoffs may  be selective, as
he least productive workers may  be fired first when the firm expe-
iences hard times (Pfann, 2006). Ill-health workers may  be among
he least productive workers. Whether the aggregate outflow of
orkers from the firm prior to closure is positively or negatively
elected on workers’ health is a priori unclear. We  exclude obser-
ations on firms that reduced their workforce by at least 20% during
he four years prior to the year of observation. This ensures that job
oss due to firm closure comes relatively suddenly rather than after
 period of prior layoffs.
Table 1 compares workers that stayed on the job (our control
roup) with workers who were laid off due to firm closure (our
reatment group). It shows that workers who were laid off due to
rm closure were on average very similar in terms of age, having
een born in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children,
ospitalization status (in t − 1) and wage income (in t − 1) to those
ho stayed on their jobs.9 Workers who lost their jobs involuntar-
inimum wage at full-time employment in 2004, making it less likely that the
ample contains many part-time workers.
7 As firms may  consist of multiple plants between which jobs may  be reallocated
pon a shock, we select the sample on firm-level criteria.
8 The 40 percent threshold is meant to strike a balance between two  extremes. On
he  one hand, increasing the lower bound will retain more observations on workers
mployed in firms that are actually restarting or being acquired; their workforces
ay  not be exposed to a severe shock, possibly biasing our result. On the other hand,
educing the lower bound to, say, 20 percent, would exclude a closing firm with five
orkers from the sample, if one of its workers got employed elsewhere within a
ear. Our threshold choice will be subject to sensitivity testing.
9 Age (in years) is measured as per December 31st. Being born in the Netherlands
s  measured by a dummy  variable that equals one if the worker and worker’s parents
ere born in the Netherlands and zero otherwise. Hospitalization status (in t − 1) is aFig. 1. Probability of death within five years for men  (%), by labor force state.
ily in closing firms had on average lower job tenure than workers
who stayed on their jobs. Job loss due to firm closure was  relatively
frequent in commercial services. In transportation and communi-
cation and construction, relatively few workers lost their jobs.
Firm-level annual averages of worker characteristics are based
on observations from all firms where any of the sample workers
was working during the time of observation. Firm-level annual
averages of most worker characteristics were similar for workers
employed in closing firms and for workers employed in firms that
continued operations. The percentage of workers having died dur-
ing the preceding four years was  on average higher for closing firms
than for firms that continued operations. This suggests that work-
ers employed in closing firms had on average poorer health than
those employed in firms that did not close. Part of the explanation
for these differences in firm-level worker mortality rates may be
that workers in closing firms were on average slightly older than
those in firms that continued operations.
Fig. 1 shows that the percentage of workers dying within five
years was  larger for workers who  were laid off due to firm closure
than for workers who  stayed on their jobs.10 The graph for laid-
off workers is not as smooth as the graph for workers staying on
their jobs. This is due to the small number of observations in the
treatment group.
3. Institutional setting
The institutional setting within which job loss takes place may
be very relevant when assessing the extent to which job loss trans-
lates into changes of (lifetime) earnings, that, in turn, can be directly
relevant for mortality. For instance, using US data, Sullivan and Von
Wachter (2009) find that the effect of job loss on mortality runs
through (lifetime) earnings, but their measured effect may  have
turned out very different in labor market environments that fea-
tured different employment protection legislation, determination
dummy  variable that is one if an individual was hospitalized during the previous year
and zero otherwise. Wage income is deflated to 2004 and measured in thousands of
euros. Job tenure is measured in years, as per January 1st. Marital status is a dummy
variable that is one if an individual was married on January 1st and zero otherwise.
Being married also includes having a registered partnership (a Dutch legal status
effectively very similar to marriage). Cohabiting without being married or without
having a registered partnership is not included in our definition of being married.
Firm size is measured as the number of workers employed at the firm on January
1st.
10 The five year mortality rate was significantly larger at the one percent level for
workers who were laid off due to firm closure than for those workers who stayed
on  their jobs.
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics.a
Workers who  stayed in their jobs in the year of
observation (control group)
Workers who lost their jobs due to firm closure in the
year of observation (treatment group)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 51.74 4.27 Age 52.33 4.39
Born  in the Netherlands 0.90 0.30 Born in the Netherlands 0.89 0.32
Married 0.82 0.39 Married 0.81 0.39
Number of children 1.92 1.21 Number of children 1.89 1.20
Hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0502 0.2184 Hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0496 0.2170
Wage income [t − 1] 44.65 23.60 Wage income [t − 1] 45.57 24.80
Job  tenure 16.18 8.02 Job tenure 14.12 7.99
Firm  size 126.68 109.97 Firm size 121.71 103.47
Year  2004.00 0.81 Year 2004.04 0.84
Industry Industry
Agriculture 0.018 0.131 Agriculture 0.009 0.093
Asset  Management 0.028 0.164 Asset Management 0.023 0.149
Banking/Insurance 0.013 0.115 Banking/Insurance 0.026 0.160
Catering 0.006 0.079 Catering 0.006 0.076
Commercial Services 0.073 0.261 Commercial Services 0.164 0.370
Construction 0.159 0.366 Construction 0.113 0.316
Education 0.074 0.261 Education 0.081 0.273
Health Care 0.015 0.121 Health Care 0.022 0.147
Manufacturing 0.283 0.450 Manufacturing 0.268 0.443
Other  Care 0.057 0.231 Other Care 0.056 0.229
Public  Sector 0.062 0.240 Public Sector 0.063 0.243
Retail  0.126 0.332 Retail 0.101 0.301
Transportation/ Communication 0.082 0.274 Transportation/ Communication 0.049 0.217
Temporary work 0.005 0.069 Temporary work 0.019 0.136
Firm-level worker characteristics Firm-level worker characteristics
%  Died [t − 4 until t − 1] 0.88 1.41 % Died [t − 4 until t − 1] 1.05 1.68
Age  40.99 3.72 Age 41.92 4.28
Female 0.25 0.22 Female 0.26 0.23
Born  in the Netherlands 0.87 0.11 Born in the Netherlands 0.86 0.13
Married 0.59 0.13 Married 0.60 0.13
Number of children 1.21 0.43 Number of children 1.21 0.44
Hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0239 0.0237 Hospitalized [t − 1] 0.0252 0.0253
Wage income [t − 1] 32.66 14.99 Wage income [t − 1] 34.94 15.26
Job  tenure 8.08 3.27 Job tenure 8.49 3.97
N 8,394























N  840,886 
a Years of observation: 2003–2005, wage income deflated to 2004 and measured
f pension benefits, eligibility criteria and length of unemployment
enefits, or health insurance coverage, among others.
We do not expect strong short-term earning losses subsequent
o job loss for the workers in our sample, because of generous
nd lengthy unemployment insurance benefits in the Netherlands
uring the period studied.11 Substantial lifetime earnings losses
ay only be expected for workers experiencing unemployment for
urations beyond the time horizon for which we consider mortality.
Fig. 2 shows that about 70% of the laid-off workers were
mployed during the calendar year after job loss. Fig. 3 shows
hat those employed during the calendar year after job loss had
n average a similar wage income as during the calendar year
efore they lost their jobs. While such patterns can be consis-
ent with laid-off workers experiencing only short unemployment
pells with limited earnings losses, the unemployment scarring lit-
rature (e.g. Stevens, 1997; Eliason and Storrie, 2006) suggests that
nemployment spells may  result in life-time earnings losses even if
hort-term earnings effects are modest. Eliason and Storrie (2006)
rgue that strong tenure-based employment protection laws, such
s the ones in the Netherlands, may  make laid-off workers’ labor
arket position more vulnerable to future shocks, possibly result-
ng in long-term earnings losses.12
11 Some institutional detail on employment protection in the Netherlands can be
ound in the Appendix A.
12 Endogeneity of unemployment duration, careers and earnings to workers’ health
revents us from further studying the role of lifetime income.Fig. 2. Employment rate (%) in the calendar year following job loss.
This figure is based on observations on workers who  lost their jobs in 2003 or 2004.
Accessibility of health care may  principally be relevant for the
effect of job loss on mortality as well. Reduced access to health
insurance and health care due to the event of unemployment may
trigger an effect of job loss on mortality. Especially if access to health
care is limited, even modest untreated health issues may  get out
of control and result in some cases in death. In the Netherlands,
there is mandatory health insurance membership for all residents,
82 H. Bloemen et al. / Journal of Health
Fig. 3. Average wage income (in thousands of euros) for those who lost their jobs
































increases the probability of death within four years by 44% and
36%, respectively. They use Swedish and Danish data on working
age men, respectively.age income is real wage income based on employment during the full calendar
ear. This figure is based on observations on workers who lost their jobs in 2003 or
004.
ndependent of employment status. The government determines
 minimum package of insurable risks that each health insurance
ontract must cover. Payments of health insurance premiums are
ubsidized for low income earners. Thus, basic access to health care
s arranged for every resident. Given the universal access to health
are and the comprehensive coverage, we hardly expect any effect
f unemployment on mortality that can be attributed to reduced
ccess to health care.13
. Identification strategy
To delineate our identification strategy, it is helpful to intro-
uce some notation. Let Y be a dummy  variable for mortality within
ve years, the outcome of interest. For workers staying employed
t equals one if the individual died within the five years after
ecember 31st of the year of observation, and for job losers it equals
ne if the individual died within five years after the exact date of
ob loss. Y equals zero for all individuals staying alive. We  are inter-
sted in the treatment effect of job loss on Y. Let D be a dummy
ariable indicating treatment. D is equal to one if an individual lost
is job due to firm closure and zero otherwise.
Write the average treatment effect of job loss on mortality as
 = ATE = E (Y1|X) − E (Y0|X) (1)
ith Y1 the outcome under treatment (D = 1) and Y0 the outcome
f untreated (D = 0), and X observed control variables. The average
reatment effect  can be expressed this way under the conditional
ean independence assumption (2)14:
(Y0|X, D) = E(Y0|X)and E (Y1|X, D) = E(Y1|X). (2)
For the outcome Y we specify the linear probability model
 = ˇ0 + D  ̨ + Xˇ1 + ε (3)
The expected value of the error term ε conditional on observ-








, g = 0, 1. (4)
13 Further institutional details on health insurance can be found in the Appendix.
14 Alternatively, the (stronger) conditional independence assumption can be
mposed. Economics 59 (2018) 78–90
An unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect  can be
obtained with (3), when making the additional assumption15
E (ε0|X) = E(ε1|X). (5)
The zero conditional mean assumption (2) asserts that condi-
tional on the control variables included in X, the treatment job loss
due to firm closure was as good as randomly assigned. Within clos-
ing firms, all workers were dismissed, and thus worker job loss is
independent of individual workers’ health. However, it may  well
be that workers employed in closing firms differed from workers
employed in firms that did not close. One concern is that closing
firms may  have hired a certain selection of workers that had rela-
tively poor health and a relatively high probability of death within
five years. We  observe that closing firms actually had on average
a higher fraction of workers dying during the four years preceding
the year of closure than firms that did not close. The conditional
independence assumption may  be violated if we only control for
individual worker characteristics such as age. We  therefore control
for pre-existing between-firm differences in health and mortality
rates by including as control variables the firm-level fractions of
workers having been hospitalized (in t − 1), and of workers having
died in any of the preceding four years, as well. The variables on
individual worker characteristics included in X are a third-order
polynomial in age, job tenure, a dummy  variable for being born in
the Netherlands, a dummy  variable for being married, the number
of children, a dummy  variable for hospitalization (in t − 1), wage
income (in t − 1), industry dummies and firm size.16 X also includes
time-varying firm-level fractions of workers being female, of work-
ers being born in the Netherlands, and of workers being married. X
further includes time-varying firm-level averages of workers’ age,
job tenure, number of children and wage income (in t − 1).
The parameters of Eq. (3) are estimated using our data as pooled
cross section. It is important to notice that workers in the control
and treatment group are on average very similar in many dimen-
sions, in particular demographics. This takes away the need to
use a method such as propensity score matching to correct for
observably unbalanced treatment/control samples. As many work-
ers were observed in multiple years and all firms had multiple
workers, we  cluster standard errors both at the individual and firm
level to account for serial correlation in the error terms. We  perform




Table 2 shows that job loss due to firm closure increased the
probability of death within five years by 0.60 percentage points or
34%. This effect is significant at the one percent level. We  discuss in
Section 5.3 that our results on the effects of job loss on mortality on
alternative time horizons are similar to those of Eliason and Storrie
(2009a) and Browning and Heinesen (2012), who find that job loss15 This can be verified using (2) and (3) to write E(Y1 − Y0|X) =  + E(ε1 − ε0|X). Under
(5), the latter term vanishes.
16 We use the public sector as the base industry. The first, second and third
order age terms are defined as (age − 45), (age − 45)2and(age − 45)3. The industry
dummies are dummies for each industry as classified by Nomenclature statistique
des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (NACE) 1993 codes
(Statistics Netherlands, 2004).
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Table  2
Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimates for the probability of death within five
years (in percentage points) (Ordinary Least Squares, OLS).a
Variable Coef. Std. Err.




Born in the Netherlands 0.1623 0.0719
Married −0.7989*** 0.0632
Number of children −0.1121*** 0.0191
Hospitalized [t − 1] 1.0750*** 0.0866
Wage income [t − 1] −0.0086*** 0.0008
Job  tenure −0.0354*** 0.0032




Asset Management −0.0133 0.1240
Banking/Insurance 0.3075* 0.1645
Catering −0.1411 0.2628
Commercial Services 0.0952 0.1011
Construction −0.1115 0.0952
Education −0.0985 0.0970
Health Care −0.1864 0.1449
Manufacturing −0.0706 0.0875
Other Care 0.0505 0.1066
Retail −0.0350 0.0922
Transportation/Communication −0.0539 0.1047
Temporary work −0.4936* 0.2965
Firm-level worker characteristics
% Died [t − 4 until t − 1] 1.5024*** 0.0256
Hospitalized [t − 1] −1.4798** 0.6128
Age  −0.1437*** 0.0075
Female 0.3911** 0.1830
Born in the Netherlands −0.6322*** 0.1767
Married 0.9028*** 0.2255
Number of children 0.0769 0.0839
Wage income [t − 1] 0.0030*** 0.0011
Job  tenure 0.0672*** 0.0081
Constant −24.094 28.530
N  849,280
a Public sector is the reference industry. Standard errors are clustered at the indi-
vidual and firm level.
* Significant at the 10% level.

















work-related accidents, or accidents that occur when commuting
between home and work.
17 We consider a cause to be frequent if there are at least 250 deaths recorded in
our  dataset.*** Significant at the 1% level.
The coefficient estimates on most control variables show signs
s we expect them to be. The probability of death within five years
s positively related with age and being hospitalized and negatively
elated with wage income. The firm-level mortality rate shows
 positive relation with individual mortality. This captures firm-
evel mortality effects from stress and work conditions, but also
ealth-related hiring policy and other ways of sorting and selec-
ion of workers into firms. The firm-level annual averages of age
nd hospitalization status have negative coefficients (conditional
n firm-level mortality).
.2. Effects of job loss on cause-specific mortality
Specific causes of death may  be related to working or being
aid off. For instance, if job loss would induce high stress levels,
he effect of job loss on mortality may  run through diseases of the
irculatory system, amongst others. We  estimate the linear prob-
bility model in (3) using a dummy  variable for death within five
ears due to a specific frequent cause as a dependent variable to
et more insight in the mechanism through which job loss affects Economics 59 (2018) 78–90 83
mortality.17 We  base the definition of causes of death on the 10th
Revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems (ICD-10). The ICD is a health sta-
tus classification system by the World Health Organization (WHO,
2010). The ICD groups causes of death into chapters, and we esti-
mate the model separately per chapter. For the most frequent
causes of death, cancer and diseases of the circulatory system, we
also estimate the model for so-called blocks (subchapters). We  esti-
mate the model for intentional self-harm (suicide) as well, because
this may  be a relevant cause of death in the context of this paper.
As job loss may  induce workers to change their life style, we also
estimate the model for alcohol-related mortality and mortality due
to smoking-related cancers. There are no chapters or blocks that
directly identify alcohol-related diseases or smoking-related can-
cers. Following Eliason and Storrie (2009a) for both of these groups
of diseases and Browning and Heinesen (2012) for alcohol-related
diseases only, we  create corresponding categories. The category
mortality due to smoking-related cancers consists of fatalities due
to cancers of the respiratory system, among which lung cancer is
the most frequent. According to Alberg and Samet (2003), 90% of the
lung cancer cases can be attributed to active smoking. The category
mortality due to alcohol-related diseases consists of fatalities that
can directly be attributed to alcohol use.18 We  apply the Bonferroni
correction for multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 3 shows that the coefficients on job loss are not significant
at the ten percent level for mortality due to any of the specific death
causes. This indicates that the effects of job loss on cause-specific
mortality do not differ significantly across causes of death. Limited
frequencies of cause-specific fatalities seem to be at least partly
driving the lack of statistical significance. Small treatment group
size contributes to coefficient estimates being imprecise and having
in some cases values that appear unrealistically high or low. The
Bonferroni correction being overly conservative in rejecting null
hypotheses may be another factor explaining why the coefficient
on job loss is not significant for any of the specific causes of death.
If we  do not correct for multiple hypothesis testing, the coef-
ficient estimate of job loss on the probability of death within five
years is positive and significant at the five percent level for mor-
tality due to diseases of the circulatory system and positive and
significant at the ten percent level for mortality due to neoplasms
(cancers). The effect on mortality due to neoplasms is driven by
smoking-related cancers and the effect on mortality due to diseases
of the circulatory system is driven by cerebrovascular diseases.
Hypertension is the most important modifiable risk factor for cere-
brovascular diseases.19 Other risk factors include diabetes, obesity,
alcohol use, smoking, lack of physical exercise, high cholesterol,
high blood glucose levels and low fruit and vegetable intake (WHO,
2009).20 Risk factors for hypertension include obesity, smoking,
alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and stress (Kaplan and
Nunes, 2003; Appel et al., 2006; Truelsen et al., 2006).
We find that job loss decreased the probability of death within
five years due to external causes (excluding intentional self-
harm). This effect is significant at the five percent level and
may  be explained by workers who  stayed on their jobs dying in18 The causes of death classification with the corresponding ICD-10 codes is
included in Table A1 of the Appendix A.
19 Age is an important risk factor for these and most of the other diseases discussed
as  well, but is not modifiable.
20 Risk factor indicates a factor that is correlated with the prevalence of a disease.
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Table 3
LPM estimates for the effect of job loss on the probability of death within five years due to a specific cause of death (in percentage points).a
Cause of death Coef. Std. Err. #Deaths
Alcohol-related diseases 0.0461 0.0291 113
Neoplasms 0.2377 0.1232 4,695
Malignant neoplasms of digestive organs 0.0885 0.0731 1,608
Malignant neoplasms of intrathoracic organs 0.0243 0.0662 1,424
Smoking-related cancer 0.0520 0.0264 36
Malignant neoplasms of urinary tract −0.0301 0.0245 296
Malignant neoplasms, stated or presumed to be primary, of lymphoid, haematopoietic and related tissue −0.0033 0.0298 309
Other  malignant neoplasms 0.1062 0.0624 1,022
Diseases of the circulatory system 0.2453 0.1006 2,260
Ischaemic heart diseases 0.0882 0.0596 1,075
Cerebrovascular diseases 0.0875 0.0416 286
Other  forms of heart disease 0.0696 0.0701 899
External causes of morbidity and mortality except intentional self-harm −0.0389 0.0171 277
Intentional self-harm 0.0063 0.0291 271
Other  diseases 0.1001 0.0671 1,126
Total  0.5968*** 0.1722 8,741




for the model as specified in (3) with the probability of death within five years due to a specific cause (in
percentage points) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are job loss, (age − 45) , (age  − 45)2, (age − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status,







































specifications with and without controlling for firm-level worker
averages is unaffected by the added flexibility.21uring  the preceding four years and firm-level annual averages on age, gender, bei
 − 1), wage income (in t − 1) and job tenure. Standard errors are clustered at the in
n  our sample. Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing is applied. *Sig
The positive effect of job loss on mortality due to cerebrovascu-
ar diseases and mortality due to diseases of the circulatory system
n general is consistent with Browning and Heinesen (2012). They
uggest that the effect of job loss on mortality due to diseases of
he circulatory system runs through stress. Black et al. (2015) find
hat job loss affects health through smoking-related diseases. We
nd this as well.
.3. Mortality effects of job loss by year since layoff
So far, we have focused on mortality within five years as the out-
ome variable. Estimating the model specified in (3) with mortality
ithin fewer years as the outcome variable may  provide insights on
ow long it takes for job loss to affect mortality. Table 4 shows that
ob loss has a positive 0.22 percentage point or 86% strong effect
n mortality in the first year after job loss. The effect of job loss on
ortality in the first two years after job loss is 0.34 percentage point
r 61% and the effect of job loss on mortality in the first three years
fter job loss is 0.36 percentage point or 39%. The effect of job loss
n mortality in the first four years after job loss is 0.55 percentage
oint or 41%. The relative sizes of these effects across time hori-
ons are consistent with Browning and Heinesen (2012), who  find
hat job loss increased mortality by 84% in the first year after dis-
lacement, 36% in the first four years after displacement and 17% in
he first ten years after displacement. The relative size of the effect
stimated by Eliason and Storrie (2009a), who find that job loss
ncreased the probability of death within four years by 44%, is con-
istent with our result as well. On the mechanisms driving the short
un effect, Browning and Heinesen (2012) and Eliason and Storrie
2009a) find that job loss increases the probability of death due to
lcohol-related disease and suicides within one year. Browning and
einesen (2012) find that job loss increases the probability of death
ue to circulatory disease and mental illness (as secondary cause
f death) within one year as well.
.4. Robustness checks
.4.1. Robustness checks on functional form specification
We  verify whether our baseline result is sensitive to functional
orm specification changes, and variations in the regressor set.
e deviate from the baseline by leaving out one of the indepen-
ent variables or one group of independent variables at a time.n in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children, hospitalization status (in
al and firm level. #Deaths are the number of unique deaths for each cause of death
t at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level.***Significant at the 1% level.
The effects of job loss on mortality are not significantly different
from the baseline estimate for any of these alternative specifi-
cations. Table 5, variation a, shows that the effect of job loss on
mortality when excluding firm-level worker characteristics is 0.83
percentage points or 46%. This is larger than the baseline estimate.
Excluding individual firm-level worker characteristics generally
does not affect our result much (variations b through j), except for
excluding firm-level mortality which leads to the estimated param-
eter of interest to increase relative to the baseline (variation b).
These results suggest that there is a bias in upward direction in the
point estimate of the effect of job loss on mortality if we do not con-
trol for pre-existing differences in worker characteristics in general
and pre-existing differences in worker mortality rates in particular.
Our baseline result is in general robust to leaving individual-
level control variables or groups of such independent variables out
of the model (variations k through t). The only exceptions relate
to nonlinear age terms (variation k) and job tenure (variation q),
giving estimates that are larger than the baseline.
We can add further worker characteristics through using a more
fine-grained definition of marital status (including widowhood and
divorce), its interaction with a dummy  for having children, more
detail on the origin of foreign-born individuals, and through using
wage class dummies (instead of a continuous income measure).
Doing so substantially increases the flexibility of the specification,
even though we are unable to control for other dimensions such
as education: the wage class dummies in particular can be use-
ful, as they may  partly pick up underlying effects of education,
and experience. We  also include appropriately defined firm-level
worker averages. The coefficient estimate on job loss (variation u
in the table) is very similar to the baseline estimate. Again, remov-
ing the firm-level worker averages from here (variation v) yields a
very similar coefficient as in variation a. The exercise underscores
the stability of our baseline estimate. More important, however, is
that the difference in coefficient estimates on job loss between the21 The difference in job loss coefficient estimates between the variations u and v
is  0.22 compared to a difference in coefficient estimates between the baseline and
variation a of 0.23.
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Table  4
LPM estimates for the probability of death within less than five years (in percentage points).a
The probability of death within 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years




0.2229*** 0.3435*** 0.3645*** 0.5471*** 0.5968***
Standard error 0.0801 0.1073 0.1388 0.1522 0.1722
Relative effect (%) 85.8 60.9 39.4 41.2 33.5




for the model as specified in (3) with the probability of death within the number of years as specified in the table
(in  percentage points) as the dependent variable. The independent variables are job loss, (age − 45) , (age − 45)2, (age − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status,
number of children, hospitalization status (in t − 1), wage income (in t − 1), job tenure, firm size, industry dummies, year, firm-level annual percentage of workers dying
during  the preceding four years and firm-level annual averages on age, gender, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children, hospitalization status (in
t  − 1), wage income (in t − 1) and job tenure. Standard errors are clustered at the individual and firm level. The relative effect is the coefficient estimate on job loss times 100
divided  by the base fractions of workers who  died within the relevant number of years for workers who stayed in their jobs. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the
5%  level, *** significant at the 1% level.
Table 5
Robustness checks on functional form specification: LPM estimates for the probability of death within five years (in percentage points).a
Variation Robustness check Coef. Std. Err. Rel. effect (%)
Baseline 0.5968*** 0.1722 33.5
Variations on firm-level variables
a.  Do not control for any firm-level worker characteristic 0.8256*** 0.1873 46.4
b.  Do not control for firm-level annual percentage of workers dying [t − 4
until t − 1]
0.7763*** 0.1876 43.6
c.  Do not control for firm-level annual fraction of workers hospitalized
[t − 1]
0.5966*** 0.1722 33.5
d.  Do not control for firm-level annual average age 0.5649*** 0.1739 31.7
e.  Do not control for firm-level annual fraction of female workers 0.5951*** 0.1723 33.4
f.  Do not control for firm-level annual fraction of workers born in the
Netherlands
0.6005*** 0.1722 33.7
g.  Do not control for firm-level annual fraction of married workers 0.5943*** 0.1723 33.4
h.  Do not control for firm-level annual average number of children 0.5966*** 0.1722 33.5
i.  Do not control for firm-level annual average wage income [t − 1] 0.5990*** 0.1721 33.6
j.  Do not control for firm-level annual average job tenure 0.6357*** 0.1717 35.7
Variations on worker-level variables
k. Do not control for age 0.7573*** 0.1736 42.5
l.  Do not control for being born in the Netherlands 0.5976*** 0.1722 33.6
m.  Do not control for marital status 0.5942*** 0.1723 33.4
n.  Do not control for number of children 0.5979*** 0.1723 33.6
o.  Do not control for hospitalization[t − 1] 0.5994*** 0.1724 33.7
p.  Do not control for wage income[t − 1] 0.6081*** 0.1718 34.2
q.  Do not control for job tenure 0.6816*** 0.1720 38.3
r.  Do not control for firm size 0.5935*** 0.1723 33.3
s.  Do not control for industry dummies 0.6063*** 0.1721 34.0
t.  Do not control for year 0.5966*** 0.1723 33.5
Other  variations
u. Control for: dummy  variables for the worker being married, divorced
or widowed, these dummies interacted with a dummy  variable for
having children; a dummy  variable for the worker being from foreign
but  western descent (in addition to the dummy  for being born in the
Netherlands); dummy  variables for wage income (at t − 1) categoriesb;
and firm-level averages of the variables added here
0.5819*** 0.1711 32.7
v.  Same as -u-, without controlling for any firm-level worker
characteristic
0.8000*** 0.1865 44.9
w.  Control for age fixed effects instead of nonlinear age effects 0.5966*** 0.1723 33.5
Other  variations
x. Control for number of days hospitalized (at t − 1) instead of
hospitalization[t − 1], also at the firm-level
0.6219*** 0.1711 34.9
y.  Control for hospitalization[t − 2], hospitalization[t − 3], wage
income[t − 2], wage income[t − 3], and firm-level averages of all those
four variables
0.5963*** 0.1722 33.5
z.  Control for natural logarithm of firm size instead of firm size 0.5958*** 0.1722 33.5
aa.  Control for year fixed effects instead of linear year effects 0.5959*** 0.1722 33.5




for the model as specified in (3) with the probability of death within five years (in percentage points) as the dependent
variable. The independent variables are job loss, (age − 45) , (age  − 45)2, (age − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children, hospitalization status
(in  t − 1), wage income (in t − 1), job tenure, firm size, industry dummies, year, firm-level annual percentage of workers dying during the preceding four years and firm-level







tandard errors are clustered at the individual and firm level. *Significant at the 10%
b The lagged wage income categories are 20–30 thousand euros, 30–40 thousa
housand euros and more than 80 thousand euros.
If we include age dummies instead of nonlinear age terms as
ndependent variables, the coefficient estimate is almost identical
o the baseline estimate (variation w). Of interest for the present
nalysis is the definition of hospitalization, as our main health-l, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
os, 40–50 thousand euros, 50–60 thousand euros, 60–70 thousand euros, 70–80
related indicator. If we control for the lagged number of days
hospitalized and its firm-level average rather than using the lagged
hospitalization incidence indicator and its firm-level average, the


























































6 H. Bloemen et al. / Journal of 
oss is similar to the baseline coefficient estimate as well if we
lso include hospitalization and wage income at higher lags (t − 1
hrough t − 3), along with their firm-level worker averages (vari-
tion y). Our result is virtually unchanged as well if we  include
he natural logarithm of firm size instead of the level of firm size
variation z),22 or if we use year dummies instead of a linear trend
variation aa).
.4.2. Robustness checks on the type of job loss
Whereas we focus on job loss due to firm closure, there are other
ypes of job loss treatments that can be applied to the estimation
f the effect of job loss on mortality. These other types of job loss
nclude job loss in firms experiencing large employment declines as
pplied in Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), and job loss due to firm
ankruptcy as studied in Keefe et al. (2002). The effects of job loss on
ortality may  differ across treatments and the workers receiving
he treatments may  differ in terms of characteristics. There may
e heterogeneity of mortality effects of job loss across different
roups of workers as well. Our data is unique in that it allows us to
istinguish the three types of job loss and to compare their effects
n mortality. The three types of job loss directly relate to each other,
s job losses due to bankruptcy of firms are a subset of all job losses
ue to firm closures, which in turn are a subset of all departures
rom firms that were experiencing employment declines of at least
0% during the last year.
Table 6, variation a, shows that restricting the treatment group
o job losses due to bankruptcy-caused firm closure, yields an
nsignificant coefficient estimate. We  have applied propensity score
eighting here, because of possible selectivity of worker popula-
ions of firms that experienced bankruptcy. The insignificance of the
oefficient estimate on job loss is somewhat surprising, as there is
o a priori reason to expect such difference with the baseline esti-
ate. Extending the treatment group to job loss in firms whose
orkforce declined by at least 40%, shows an effect of job loss on
ortality that is about one-third smaller than in the baseline model
variation b).23
.4.3. Robustness checks on data selection criteria
We find an effect of job loss on mortality for a particular selec-
ion of observations that we believe represents a clean sample. We
nvestigate whether our baseline result is sensitive to changing data
election criteria. We  have not included observations on women in
ur baseline sample, because the main sample definition leaves
ew observations on women experiencing job loss. We  do wish
o explore the effect of adding observations on women, however.
able 7, variation a, shows that the coefficient estimate on job loss
emains similar to the one for the baseline sample. We  also esti-
ate the model including a dummy  for being female and its full
nteraction with all other independent variables (variation b). The
oefficient estimate on job loss is almost identical to the baseline
ase. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term between job
oss and the worker being female is not significant, however, indi-
ating that the effect of job loss on mortality is similar for women
nd for men.
Because death is relatively rare among young individuals, our
aseline selection only consists of observations on workers in the
ge category 45–59. Some other studies (such as Browning and
einesen, 2012) use observations on all working age men, though.
he mortality effect of job loss on a wider sample based on work-
22 We have tried various other specifications for firm size such as dummies for firm
ize  groups as well. Estimates for the effect of job loss on mortality were similar to
he  baseline estimate for all these alternative specifications.
23 The same criteria for selection of these observations apply as for the observations
n  the baseline dataset, except for the criterion on the treatment the worker received. Economics 59 (2018) 78–90
ers in the age category 21–59 is almost identical to the baseline
estimate (variation c). In relative terms, the effect for workers in
the age category 21–59 (61%) is much larger than the effect for the
baseline sample (34%). This is due to the baseline mortality rate for
the younger workers being much lower than for the older workers.
If we  restrict the sample to workers in the age category 21–44, the
mortality effect is in absolute terms much smaller than the baseline
effect (variation d), though it is in relative terms (61%) still larger
than the effect for the baseline sample.24 Hence, if we include work-
ers in the age category 21–59 in our sample, the effect we  find is
strongly driven by the older workers.
The baseline excludes workers employed in firms with fewer
than five and with more than 400 workers. We  do so to keep our
control group and treatment group comparable. Very large firms
may  rarely close, so that their workers end up in the control group
only. Firms with less than five workers include small-scale self-
employed; this group of firms can be expected to be relatively
unstable. Therefore, workers employed at these firms may  end up
disproportionally often in the treatment group. Variation e shows
that the effect of job loss on mortality for the extended sample
including observations on workers employed in firms with less than
five or more than 400 workers is substantially larger than the base-
line estimate — owing to the firm size distribution being strongly
skewed to the right.
Similar to Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009), the baseline
excludes observations on workers with job tenures of less than five
years to ensure that workers had stable employment relationships.
The effect of job loss on mortality is no longer significant if we also
include observations on workers with job tenures of at least one
year in our sample (variation f). People with unstable jobs may be
so used to job loss that job loss is not too much of a shock for them
and that it does not subsequently kill them. Going the other way  and
excluding workers with job tenures shorter than ten years results in
an effect that is larger than the baseline effect (variation g). Workers
with long job tenures may  have more firm-specific human capital
than workers with short job tenures. This may  make job loss lead to
larger subsequent income losses for workers with long job tenures
than for those with short job tenures. Larger income losses may
lead to larger mortality effects of job loss, possibly also through
increased stress levels.
The baseline model only selects workers with wage incomes of
at least 20,000 euros to ensure strong labor force attachment. Low-
ering this threshold to 10,000 euros hardly affects the number of
observations in our sample and has a negligible impact on the size of
the effect (variation h). The small effect on the number of observa-
tions in our sample reflects that older male workers in their career
jobs typically did not work only few hours. Conversely, excluding
workers who  earned less than 30,000 euros strongly reduces the
number of observations. In this case, the effect of job loss on mortal-
ity is smaller than the baseline estimate (variation i). One potential
explanation is that workers who  earn relatively little are more likely
to just make ends meet. Such workers may  not be able to cover reg-
ular monthly bills anymore upon job loss. The resulting stress may
then negatively affect their health and increase their probability of
death within five years.
Our main sample does not include observations on job exits
other than job loss due to firm closure. An alternative approach
is to include in the control group job exits that were not due to firm
closure. The effect of job loss on mortality estimated for the sam-
24 Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) find that the effect of job loss on mortality is
smaller for older workers. We have verified whether this is also true in our case,
adding the dummy  variable for job loss interacted with age as an independent vari-
able to the model as specified in (3). We find that the coefficient on job loss interacted
with age is not significant at the ten percent level, however.
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Table  6
LPM estimates for the probability of death within five years for alternative definitions of job loss (in percentage points).a
Variation Definition of job loss Coef. Std. Err. N treatment group Rel. eff. (%)
Job loss due to firm closure (baseline) 0.5968*** 0.1722 8,394 33.5
a.  Job loss due to firm bankruptcy −0.2411 0.6279 1,552 −13.5
b.  Job loss due to a firm-level employment declines of at least 40% 0.3797*** 0.1460 10,693 21.3




for the model as specified in (3) with the probability of death within five years (in percentage points) as the dependent
variable. The independent variables are job loss, (age − 45) , (age  − 45)2, (age − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children, hospitalization status
(in  t − 1), wage income (in t − 1), job tenure, firm size, industry dummies, year, firm-level annual percentage of workers dying during the preceding four years and firm-level
annual  averages on age, gender, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children, hospitalization status (in t − 1), wage income (in t − 1) and job tenure.
The  control groups are the same in variations a and b as in the baseline case. Variation a is estimated using propensity score weighting, because workers laid off due to firm
bankruptcy are not comparable to those in the control group. Standard errors are clustered at the individual and firm level for variation b and the baseline estimate and
clustered at the individual level for variation a. The relative effect is the coefficient estimate on job loss times 100 divided by the base fractions of workers who died within
five  years. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
Table 7
Robustness checks on data selection: LPM estimates for the probability of death within five years (in percentage points).a
Variation Robustness check Coef. Std. Err. N
Baseline 0.5968*** 0.1722 849,280
a.  Sample including women 0.5584*** 0.1444 1,075,559
b.  Sample including women; alternative specificationb 0.5900*** 0.1717 1,075,559
Coefficient dummy  job loss*dummy female −0.1368 0.3129
c.  Extended to workers in the age category 21–59 0.5983*** 0.0927 1,914,500
d.  Only workers in the age category 21–44 0.2096** 0.0871 1,065,220
e.  Incl. workers employed in firms of any size 0.9252*** 0.1537 2,113,677
f.  Incl. workers with job tenures of at least 1 year 0.1487 0.1248 970,872
g.  Excl. workers with job tenure less than 10 years 0.7450*** 0.2430 631,466
h.  Incl. workers with wage income[t − 1] of at least 10,000 euros 0.6031*** 0.1692 872,090
i.  Excl. workers with wage income[t − 1] lower than 30,000 euros 0.5031*** 0.1814 702,327
j.  Incl. job exits not due to firm closure (included in control group) 0.5606*** 0.1717 881,999
k.  Incl. firms with layoffs prior to the year of observation 0.5092*** 0.1629 968,772
l.  Incl. cases of job loss due to firm closure if at least 40% of the workers
employed in a closing firm got employed in one particular firm within one
year after firm closure
0.5813*** 0.1619 850,301




for the model as specified in (3) with the probability of death within five years (in percentage points) as the dependent
variable. The independent variables are job loss, (age − 45) , (age  − 45)2, (age − 45)3, being born in the Netherlands, marital status, number of children, hospitalization status
(in  t − 1), wage income (in t − 1), job tenure, firm size, industry dummies, year, firm-level annual percentage of workers dying during the preceding four years and firm-level


























tandard errors are clustered at the individual and firm level. * Significant at the 10
b The model in variation b also includes a dummy  variable for being female and i
le including observations on workers leaving their jobs for other
easons than firm closure is almost identical to the effect of job loss
n mortality estimated for the baseline sample (variation j). This
s not surprising, as the additional number of observations is small
ompared to the total number of observations in the control group.
We  exclude observations on workers employed at firms experi-
ncing large employment declines prior to closure to minimize the
isk that job loss is endogenous to mortality. As a robustness check,
e estimate the effect of job loss on mortality for a sample that
onsists of observations on workers employed in firms that experi-
nced any employment reductions in the years preceding closure.
e find that this effect is smaller than the baseline effect (vari-
tion k). Workers employed in firms that experienced prior mass
ayoffs may  have become better able to handle layoff-related stress
y their prior experiences. This may  have made the effect of job loss
n mortality smaller for these workers.
The baseline sample excludes observations on workers who
ere laid off due to firm closure if at least 40% of the workforce
ot employed in one particular firm within one year after closure.
e select our sample so as to rule out that closing firms may  have
estarted or may  have been taken over by another firm, effectively
eeping workers in employment. Estimating the effect of job loss
n mortality for the dataset that includes these observations pro-
ides an effect that is almost identical to the baseline estimate
variation l).l, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
raction with all other independent variables.
6. Conclusions
We study the effect of job loss on mortality. As ill-health work-
ers may  be more likely to lose their jobs than healthier workers,
simply regressing job loss on mortality will result in a coefficient
estimate on job loss that is biased upwards. Studies in the litera-
ture attempt to avoid such endogeneity bias by using job loss due to
firm closure (Eliason and Storrie, 2009a; Browning and Heinesen,
2012; Michaud et al., 2016) and job loss in firms experiencing
large firm-level employment declines (Sullivan and Von Wachter,
2009) as treatments to estimate mortality effects of job loss. These
treatments may  still not be free of endogeneity bias, however. We
actually find that firm-level mortality rates during the four preced-
ing years were higher in closing firms than in firms that survived.
These pre-existing differences in firm-level worker mortality rates
may  exist due to selective hiring or due to non-random worker
outflow prior to firm closure or downsizing. We  control for pre-
existing differences in firm-level worker health and mortality rates
and other firm-level worker characteristics. To our knowledge, we
are the first paper in the literature to do so.
We  find that job loss due to firm closure increased the proba-
bility of death within five years by 0.60 percentage point, or 34%.
This is similar to the findings of Eliason and Storrie (2009a) and
Browning and Heinesen (2012). We find that job loss increased the
probability of death within five years by 0.83 percentage point or






















































Cause of death classification.
Cause of death ICD−10 codesa
Alcohol-related diseases F10, G31.2, G62.1, K29.2, K70, K85.2,













or presumed to be primary,
of  lymphoid, haematopoietic
and related tissue
C81–C96
Other malignant neoplasms C00–C14, C40–C63, C68–C80, C79,
D00–D48
Diseases of the circulatory
system
I00–I99
Ischaemic heart diseases I20–I25
Cerebrovascular diseases I60–I69
Other forms of heart disease I00–I19, I26–I59, I70–I99











Other diseases A00–A99, B00–B99, D50–D89,
E00–E90, F00–F99, G00–G99,
H00–H95, J00–J99, K00–K93, L00–L99,
M00–M99, N00–N99, O00–O99,
P00–P96, Q00–Q99, R00–R99,
S00–S99, T00–T99, U00–U85, Z00–Z99
workers in our dataset did not reach the age of 60 yet, they were not
eligible to retire early after job loss without getting re-employed
first. However, UI benefits may  have provided the opportunity to8 H. Bloemen et al. / Journal of 
6% if we do not control for firm-level worker characteristics. This
ifference in estimated effects, albeit statistically insignificant, sug-
ests that the coefficient estimate of job loss on mortality is biased
pward if we do not control for firm-level worker characteristics.
Taking a closer look at the mechanism driving the effect of job
oss on mortality, we find that job loss due to firm closure may
rguably run through stress, as cause-specific mortality analysis
hows that (acute) diseases of the circulatory system are important
rivers of the effect. The strong effect of job loss on mortality in the
rst year after job loss is consistent with an effect running through
tress and (acute) diseases of the circulatory system. Eliason and
torrie (2009a) and Browning and Heinesen (2012) likewise find
hat diseases of the circulatory system are important drivers of the
ffect of job loss on mortality. Changes in lifestyle seem to be rele-
ant too, because smoking-related cancers account for part of the
ffect of job loss on mortality. This is consistent with Black et al.
2015), who find that job loss negatively affects health through
moking-related diseases.
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ppendix A. Employment protection in the Netherlands
5. Employment protection in the Netherlands
Laid-off workers with employment tenures as the ones in
ur dataset were eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) ben-
fits of up to five years, irrespective of whether the firm they
ere employed in closed down.25 The potential UI benefit dura-
ion depended positively on the employment tenure of the
orker.26 The replacement rate was 70% of the final wage (Dutch
overnment, 2015a), up to a ceiling of 168 euro per day (44,000
uros per year; values for 2004).27 So, even if workers were not re-
mployed soon after job loss, the effects of job loss on net income
n time horizons shorter than five years were arguably modest for
orkers with income levels below 44,000 euros per year but larger
or workers with income levels above this threshold.
In addition to UI benefits, laid-off workers may  have received
everance pay. Workers who were laid off by firms that closed
own but did not go bankrupt received severance pay from their
mployer in certain cases. There were two layoff routes for work-
rs employed in this type of closing firms: via the court or via the
mployee Insurance Agency (Dutch Government, 2015b,c). Lay-
ffs via the former route typically resulted in severance pay for
he laid-off workers. The levels of these compensations depended
trongly and positively on age, job tenure and wage income. Com-
ensations for workers aged 45 with job tenure of five years, i.e.
he youngest workers with the lowest job tenure in our dataset,
ypically amounted to about half an annual wage. In the latter
ase employers had to seek permission by the Employee Insurance
gency to lay off workers. If permission was granted, employers
25 Eligibility was  conditional on, for instance, actively looking for a job.
26 The data of Statistics Netherlands do not go back far enough in the past to
etermine the maximum duration for unemployment benefit per individual.
27 Workers did not build up occupational pension capital during unemployment.a More information on the ICD-10 can be found on http://apps.who.int/
classifications/icd10/browse/2015/en.
could typically lay off workers without giving them any com-
pensation. Workers may  in this case have gone to court to seek
compensations from their (former) employers.
Workers did typically not receive any severance pay for job
loss due to firm bankruptcy (Berntsen and Mulder, 2014; Van Riet,
2014),28 except for two, rather uncommon, cases. First, if some
inventory remained after the trustee and preferred creditors were
paid. Second, if a board member of the employer inappropriately
extracted financial wealth from the firm prior to bankruptcy and
he or she was  held liable for this (Dutch Government, 2015d).
The oldest workers in our dataset may  have used UI as an alter-
native retirement path.29 The social security eligibility age in the
Netherlands was 65 during the period studied. Early retirement
pensions of occupational pension funds generally offered benefits
as of age 60, 61 or 62 in our dataset, depending on the pension
fund. They typically required workers to have been employed con-
tinuously for a certain number of years prior to early retirement. As28 Workers may  have asked the judge to get severance pay in case of firm
bankruptcy. This severance pay was paid out of what was left of the inventory after
the  trustee and preferred creditors had been paid. However, as there was  typically
nothing left of the inventory, chances to get severance pay by making a request to
the  judge were very low.
29 Chan and Stevens (2001) find that job loss among older workers has strong and
lasting effects on employment rates. Tatsiramos (2010) finds that older workers
who are displaced in countries with relatively more generous UI provisions have
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lose part of the gap in earnings between the time of job loss and
eaching the normal retirement age, especially for the oldest work-
rs in our sample.
Job loss may  have affected lifetime income through lower pen-
ion benefits as well. Occupational pensions are predominantly
f the defined benefit type, with replacement rates depending on
verage career wage income and the number of years individuals
ave contributed to the pension scheme. Non-working individuals
ot receiving UI benefits do not contribute to the pension scheme
n principle. They typically contribute less to the pension scheme
f they do receive UI benefits. Due to contributing less or nothing
uring spells of unemployment, individuals losing their jobs also
ose some of their pension benefits.
0. The Dutch health insurance system
The Dutch health insurance system features mandatory partic-
pation and subsidization of premiums (contributions, fees). The
ystem underwent important changes in 2006. Before that year,
here was mandatory health insurance membership for people with
ncome levels below a threshold.30 This national insurance had
 large coverage of medical treatments. Individuals with higher
ncomes could take private health insurance or health insurance
ffered through their employers. As of 2006, there is a compulsory
asic health insurance for all residents. Basic health insurance cov-
rs health expenditures for a large variety of treatments, specified
y the government. There was a no-claim bonus in 2006 and 2007
nd there is a mandatory minimum deductible as of 2008.31 Peo-
le with low income levels get a monthly benefit that helps them
ay their basic health insurance premiums. Over and above the
andatory basic coverage, people can buy supplementary health
nsurance for, e.g., vision care and dental care. Long-term care is
ot covered by the basic health insurance, but financed through a
eparate universal system to which all workers pay premiums.
2. The Dutch pension system32
The Dutch pension system rests on three pillars (Bovenberg
nd Meijdam, 2001). The first pillar is the public old-age pen-
ion system, financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. Contributions
tem from workers and employers. All residents registered in the
etherlands accrue public old-age pension rights. Public old-age
ension benefits are flat. For couples, they equal the minimum
age. Singles receive 70% of the minimum wage. For every year
etween the ages 15 and 65 that an individual does not reside in
he Netherlands, public old-age benefits are cut by two  percentage
oints. The second pillar consists of occupational pensions (includ-
ng company-specific funds of large firms, and industry-wide funds
overing all occupations in an industry). These are funded pen-
ions and are generally managed on the sector level. The third pillar
onsists of private provisions. Private provisions include, amongst
thers, annuities or life insurance policies.
About 90% of all workers participate in an occupational pension
lan. Occupational pension schemes receive contributions from
orkers and employers. Workers who participate in a pension plan
ay contributions over the difference between their wage and a
ominal threshold called the “franchise”. The franchise is about
43% of the public-old age pension benefit level. In this way, first-
30 The income threshold gradually increased across years and was  33,000 euros in
005.
31 The no-claim bonus for basic health insurance was 255 euros in 2006 and 2007.
he deductible for basic health insurance was  150 euros in 2008 and gradually
ncreased afterwards.
32 This section is obtained from Bloemen et al. (2017). Economics 59 (2018) 78–90 89
pillar old age pensions and second-pillar occupational pensions are
integrated and jointly achieve before-tax replacement rates of 70%
of the average pay for the cohorts we study. As every firm or sector
has its own  pension plan and pension conditions, there is a large
heterogeneity among occupational pensions. For the time period
studied, early retirement pensions, embedded in the occupational
pension system, were widespread, owing to tax incentives.33 There
was a large heterogeneity in early retirement arrangements across
sectors as well.
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